

ECE 471 – Embedded Systems

Lecture 25

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Announcements

- HW#8 was extended
- HW#10 will be assigned, due in two weeks
- Project topics due Monday



HW#9

- Re-use i2c display code from earlier homework
- Re-use temp code (either TMP36 or the 1-wire)
- Display the temperature on LED.
- 4 cases
 - 00.0 to 99.9
 - -99 to 0
 - 100 to 999
 - Error
- Will require you making numbers if you haven't already,



but otherwise should be straightforward re-use of old code.



Case Studies



Social Engineering



Worrisome embedded systems

- Backdoors in routers.
- Voting Machines, ATMs
- pacemakers
- Rooting phones
- Rooting video games
- Others?



Voting Machines

- Maine has paper ballot — not too bad
- Often are old and not tested well (Windows XP, only used once a year)
- USB ports and such exposed, private physical access
- Can you trust the software? What if notices it is Election Day and only then flips 1/10th the vote from Party A to Party B. Would anyone notice? What if you have source code?
- What if the OS does it. What if Windows had code that



on Election Day looked for a radio button for Party A and silently changed it to Party B when pressed?

- OK you have and audit the source code. What about the compiler? (Reflections on Trusting Trust). What about the compiler that compiled the compiler?
- And of course the hardware, but that's slightly harder to implement but a lot harder to audit.



Examples – CANbus

- 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile
U of Washington and UCSD.
- Fuzzing/ARM/CANbus
- can control brakes (on / off suddenly)
- heating, cooling, lights, instrument panel
- windows/locks Why? fewer wires if on a bus than direct-wired
- electronic stability control, antilock, need info from each



wheel

- roll stability control (affect braking, turning to avoid rollover)
- cruise control
- pre-crash detection (tighten seatbelts, charge brakes)
- while it might be nice to have separate busses for important and unimportant, in practice they are bridged
- Locks– monitor buttons, also remote keyfob... but also disengage if airbag deploys
- OnStar – remotely monitor car, even remotely stop it (in case of theft) over wireless modem




- Access? OBD-II port, also wireless
- 2009 car
- cars after 2008 required to have canbus?
- Problems with CAN
 - Broadcast... any device can send packets to any other
 - Priority.. devices set own priority, can monopolize bus
 - No authentication... any device can control any other
 - Challenge-response. Cars are supposed to block attempts to re-flash or enter debug mode without auth. But, mostly 16-bits, and required to allow a try every 10s, so can brute force in a week.



- If you can re-flash firmware you can control even w/o ongoing access
- Not supposed to disable CAN or reflash firmware while car moving, but on the cars tested they could.
- Probing – packet sniffing, fuzzing (easier as packet sizes small)
- experiments – on jackstands or closed course
- controlled radio – display, sounds, chimes
- Instrument panel – set arbitrary speed, rpm, fuel, odometer, etc
- Body control – could lock/unlock (jam by holding down



- lock), pop trunk, blow horn, wipers on, lights off
- Engine... mess with timing. forge "airbag deployed" to stop engine
 - Brakes.. managed to lock brakes so bad even reboot and battery removal not fix, had to fuzz to find antidote
 - can over-ride started switch. wired-or
 - test on airport. cord to yank laptop out of ODB-II
 - fancy attacks. Have speedometer read too high. Disable lights. "self-destruct" w countdown on dash, horn beeping as got closer, then engine disable.



Stuxnet

- SCADA – supervisory control and data acquisition
- industrial control system
- STUXNET.. targets windows machines, but only activates if Siemens SCADA software installed. four zero-day vulnerabilities
USB flash drives
signed with stolen certificates



- Interesting as this was a professional job. Possibly by US/Israel targeting very specific range of centrifuges reportedly used by Iran nuclear program. While reporting "everything OK" the software then spun fast then slow enough to ruin equipment.



Examples – JTag/hard-disk

- JTAG/Hard-disk takeover
- <http://spritesmods.com/?art=hddhack&page=8>
- Find JTAG
- 3 cores on hard-disk board, all ARM. One unused.
- Install custom Linux on third core. Then have it do things like intercept reads and change data that is read.



Places for More Info

- Embedded projects: <http://hackaday.com>
They had a recent series on CAN-bus
- Computer Risks and Security Issues: The RISKS digest
from comp.risks
<http://www.risks.org>



Software Bugs

- Not all bugs are security issues
- Coding bugs can have disastrous effects



Automotive

- Until recently no standard
- Bugs, Toyota firmware
- <http://www.edn.com/design/automotive/4423428/2/Toyota-s-killer-firmware--Bad-design-and-its-conse>



Airplanes

- DO-178B / DO-178C
- Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification
 - Catastrophic: fatalities, loss of plane
 - Hazardous: negative safety, serious/fatal injuries
 - Major: reduce safety, inconvenience or minor injuries
 - Minor: slightly reduce safety, mild inconvenience
 - No Effect: no safety or workload impact



- AA Flight 965. Autopilot to waypoint R. Re-entered it, two starting with R, so it helpfully picked one with highest frequency, did a semi-circle turn to east right into a mountain.



Military

- Patriot missile – clock drift slightly, but when on for hundreds of hours enough to affect missile tracking
- Yorktown smart ship – 1997 – Running Windows NT. Someone entered 0 in a field, divide by 0 error, crashed the ship. Database crash, crashed propulsion system. Rumors that it needed to be towed in, but no, only down for 2.75 hours.
- F-22s computers crashed when crossing 180 degrees longitude? Lost navigation and communication, had to



follow tankers back to Hawaii.

