# ECE 435 – Network Engineering Lecture 9

Vince Weaver https://web.eece.maine.edu/~vweaver vincent.weaver@maine.edu

10 February 2025

#### Announcements

- HW#3 was posted. Encryption. No coding.
- HW#2 was extended to Monday



#### **Encrypted Messages Not Always Enough**

- Redundancy, some way to validate plaintext is valid.
   Example: if encrypting a binary blob where each byte indicates something (12 34 means order 34 cows or something), random garbage might decode to valid message
- Freshness replay attacks. What if you record old message (Bank deposits \$100 to account) and replay. Will have valid encryption.



### **Encryption Problems**

- Secret Keys leaked
  - Issue on hardware that has to decrypt but can't let user find the keys (DVD players, game consoles)
  - How to revoke keys that have been leaked? Firmware update? Over internet, on DVD?
- Poor random number generation
  - Famous Debian mistake in patching library, leading to most systems getting one of a few possible ssh keys
  - Move mouse when generating ssh keys?



# **Breaking Encryption**

- A lot of work goes into breaking encryption, either to spy, or to ensure algorithms are strong
- differential cryptanalysis (start with similar plaintexts and see what patterns occur in output)
- Power/Timing analysis note power usage or timing/cache/cycles when encryption going on, can leak info on key or algorithm Bane of perf. Cycle invariant code?
- Quantum computers?



# **Trusting Trust**

- When setting up an encrypted connection, how do you verify who is on the other side?
- How can you protect from man-in-the-middle attacks (MitM) where someone intercepts them downloading your public key, replaces with their own, then sits in the middle decrypting/re-encrypting in a transparent way?
- Some companies/countries will actually do this quite openly



# **Key Signing Parties**

- One way is to have get-togethers where friends sign each others keys
- If enough people do this, you can create a "chain of trust" where you can track someone's identity to someone you trust
- Linux kernel sorta tries this for git development
- Trouble for new people, or remote people, or people who don't travel much, or don't have many friends



# **Self-signing Keys**

- Can you just sign your own keys?
- You can, but how would someone know it's really you?
- (Though you could argue, does that always matter?)
- Most web browsers get very upset and will show lots of warnings if you use a self-signed key



#### **Certificate Authorities**

- Certificate authority an official organization that verifies identities
- Will sign a "certificate" saying who you say you are
- Operating Systems/Web-browsers will ship with a list of officially trusted Certificate Authorities
- Can hover over / click the lock symbol in URL bar to verify who signed for a website



#### **Certificate Authorities Trust**

- Can you stop trusting a certificate authority?
- What if they have a habit of signing bad keys, accidentally or on purpose (for example: signing a key saying someone is google.com that isn't)
- CAs can be removed from trusted list
- Often done gradually as not to break companies / programs depending on existing certs



# SSL/TLS

- Secure Socket Layer / Transport Layer Security (why the name change? Microsoft/Netscape rivalry back in the day)
- Handshake protocol followed by key exchange
- Browser says hello, which hashes/algorithms it supports
- Server picks one and sends back
- Server then sends a certificate (signed by authority) saying who it is, and what its public key is
- Client verifies certificate (via the CA public key it has



#### stored [comes with OS or browser]

- client generates a random number, encrypts with servers public key, sends to server, used as symmetric key
- What could go wrong, what if someone gets a hold of server private key? could decrypt logged data.
- Could try Diffie-Hellman key exchange random number plus unique session key prevents problems if server private key leaked



# SSL/TLS other

- Long history of TLS, security issues, fixes, etc
- Timeline here: https://www.feistyduck.com/ ssl-tls-and-pki-history/
- md5sum weakness actually used to trick certificate authorities at one point
- Public Key Pinning, used to find when fraudulent certificates signed by CAs
- Backwards compatibility fallback removed because could be forced to fall back to broken algorithm



- quantum-resistant encryption methods released
- google removed the lock icon



# Diffie-Hellman (used by ssh)

- Both sides agree on large prime number
- Both sides agree on algorithm (AES?)
- Each side picks independently picks another secret prime number.

This is not the authentication private key.

- The secret prime, AES, and shared prime are used to make a public key derived from the private key.
- The generated public key is shared
- The other side uses their own private key, the other side



public key, and shared prime to figure out the shared secret key.

- This secret key is then used for symmetric encryption.
- Example on p812



### **Encryption – Encrypting Hard Drives**

- LUKS on Linux
- Bitlocker?
- This gets into the whole signed/trusted firmware on modern machines
- Ransomware



# E-mail, Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

- OpenPGP RFC 4880
- Encrypt message with symmetric key, send along the key encrypted via asymmetric
- GPG free software replacement for PGP
- Can also PGP sign a message. Not encrypted, but signed with your key to verify it was in fact sent by you. Takes hash of the input, then encrypts the hash with key. Also, downloads from servers (like debian)
- Key stores and key servers?



### **Encryption – Ethics**

- Should everyone be allowed to encrypt things?
- Should governments be allowed backdoors to decrypt things?
- Strong encryption was illegal for a while

  more than 40 bit encryption an exportable munition
  Separate browser downloads for US vs foreign
  Could still export via paper and re-type in
  people got "illegal" RSA algorithm in perl t-shirts and tattoos

