# ECE 471 – Embedded Systems Lecture 26

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#### Announcements

- HW#9 was assigned, due a week from Friday
- HW#5 finally turned back
  - One note, can you do int i=01101111; to get binary?
    - No, either use hex, or use 0b01101111 (gcc extension?)
  - $\circ$  Also, note we are using LED displays not LCD.
- I will try to have HW#7 and HW#8 graded so you can use in HW#9 (HW#6 might be graded last)



• Also the midterms aren't back yet, hopefully Monday



# HW#9 Info

- Re-use i2c display code from earlier homework
- Re-use temp code (either TMP36 or the 1-wire)
- Display the temperature on display
- Code coverage, Writing good testable code
- Converting a double to characters to print
   O Use sprintf()

```
char string[128];
double temperature;
sprintf(string,"%.1lf",temperature);
/* Now string[0] has first digit, string[1] second;
```



```
• Use division/modulus
```

```
double temperature=23.4;
int hundreds,tens, ones,remainder;
```

```
hundreds=temperature/100;
remainder=temperature%100;
tens=remainder/10;
ones=remainder%10;
```



#### **Software Bugs**

- Not all bugs are security issues
- Coding bugs can have disastrous effects



# Spacecraft

- Mariner 1 (1962) rocket off course due to mis-transcribed specification into FORTRAN, missing overbar
- Apollo 11 (1969) landing on moon.
  - 36k ROM (rope), 2k RAM, 70lbs, 55W, 5600 3-input NOR
  - Processor normally loaded with 85% load. DELTAH program run which take 10%. But buggy radar device was stealing 13% even though in standby mode.



- $\circ$  Multiple 1202 overload alarms
- Mini real-time OS with priority killed low-priority tasks so things still worked.
- Ariane 5 Flight 501 (1996) famous. \$370 million.
   Old code copied from Ariane 4. Horizontal acceleration
  - Could not trigger on Ariane 4 (accel never that large)
  - $\circ$  Could trigger on more powerful Ariane 5
  - Conversion from 64-bit float to 16-bit signed int overflowed. Trap
  - Primary guidance computer crashed
  - $\circ$  Secondary computer, but ran same code, crashed



- Sent debug messages after crash, autopilot read those as velocity data
- Destructed 37s after launch
- $\circ$  Written in ADA
- NASA Mars Polar Lander (1999)
   likely mistook turbulence vibrations for landing and shut off engine 40m above surface
- NASA Mars Climate Orbiter

   ground software using lbf (pound/foot) units, craft expecting Newtons
- NASA Mars Spirit rover (2004)



- temporarily disabled due to too many files on flash drive
- $\circ$  Constantly rebooting
- Radio could understand some commands directly, could reboot with flash disabled.
- Fixed when deleted some unneeded files.
- $\circ$  Eventually reformat.
- Issue is 90 day design period, lasted years (until 2010)
- Phobos-Grunt (2012)
  - Bit flip in memory caused it to crash before firing rockets to Mars



- Entered safe mode waiting for command
- $\circ$  Antennas not deployed until after rocket firing
- Could not receive command to leave safe mode.
- ExoMars Schiaparelli Lander (2016)
  - $\circ$  Bad data to inertial measurement unit for 1 second
  - $\circ$  thought this meant it was below ground level, released parachute when still 3.7km up.
  - Had valid data from radar



### Medical Example

- Therac-25 radiation treatment machine, 1985-1987
- 6 accidents, patients given 100x dose. Three died High power beam activated w/o spreader too.
   Older machines had hardware interlock, this one in software. Race condition. If 8-bit counter overflow just as entering manual over-ride, it would happen.
- Triggering the bug
  - To trigger, had to press X (mistake), up (to correct),
     E (to set proper) then "Enter" all within 8 seconds.



This was considered an improbable series of keypresses.

- This missed during testing as it took a while for operators to get used to using machines enough to type that fast.
- Used increment rather than move to set flag, this meant sometimes it wrapped from 255 to 0, disabling safety checks
- Written in Assembly Language
- Things that went wrong with design
- Software not independently reviewed
- No reliability modeling or risk management



- Something wrong: Printed "MALFUNCTION" and error number 1 to 64 which was not documented in manual. Press P to clear.
- Operators not believe complaints from patients.
- The setup was not tested until after it was installed at hospital.
- cut-and-pasted software from earlier model that had hardware interlocks
- $\circ$  Concurrent (parallel) operation with race conditions



#### Financial

 Knight Capital. Upgrade 7 of 8 machines, missed last. Re-used a flag definition with new software. Caused massive selloff, \$440 million



#### Power

- 2003 Blackout
  - Power plant fail. Cause more current down transmission lines in Ohio. Heat, expand, touch tree, short out.
  - Race condition in Unix XA/21 management system, so alarms not go off
  - Eventually primary system fail as too many alarms queue up
  - Backup server also fail



- During failure, screens take 59s (instead of 1s) to update
- $\circ$  Blackout of most of NY and a lot of north east.



# Space Shuttle Design

- https://www.nasa.gov/mission\_pages/shuttle/flyo
  flyfeature\_shuttlecomputers.html
- Issues normal embedded systems don't have: Vibration at liftoff, Radiation in Space
- If computer stopped for more than 120ms, shuttle could crash
- "Modern" update in 1991: 1MB Ram, 1.4MIPS. Earlier was 416k and 1/3 as fast and twice as big
- Change to code, 9 months testing in simulator, 6 months



more extensive testing

- 24 years w/o in-orbit SW problem needing patches
- 12 year stretch only 3 SW bugs found
- 400k lines of code
- HAL/S high-order assembly language (high-level language similar to PL/I)
- PASS software runs tasks. Too big to fit in memory at once
- BFS backup flight software. Bare minimum to takeoff, stay in orbit, safely land, fits in memory, monitors pASS during takeoff/landing Written by completely different



team.

- 28 months to develop new version
- IBM
- Extensive verification. One internal pass, one external
- 4 computers running PASS, one running BFS
- Single failure mission can continue; still land with two failures
- 4 computers in lock-step, vote, defective one kicked out

