

ECE 471 – Embedded Systems

Lecture 29

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Announcements

- Don't forget HW#9 due next Friday
- Midterm next Friday
- Project status report due 22nd (Monday before Thanksgiving)
- Demosplash demoparty starting tonight



HW#9 – Modular Code


- What is modular code?
- In C you can compile each C file into its own object file, link together at end
- Each C file can act as self-contained module
- Can make code-reuse easier, can treat like a library
- API defined in a header .h file



- Can be easier to follow code than in one huge program
- Easier when working in shared git repository



Another Few Software Disaster Case Studies



Intentionally Buggy Code?

- There's ethics when programming
- What if company wants you to code Dark Patterns?
- Privacy? Data Logging? Tracking?
- Unintentional security leaks: fitness trackers giving away military locations
- Thermostats: forget to change password if move or divorce, others now control your heating
- Amazon/Google devices, always listening in your house
- Web-cameras everywhere




Code Safety Standards

- Avionics: DO-178C (1992 for B)
- Industrial: IEC 61508 (1998)
- Railway: CENELEC EN 50128 (2001)
- Nuclear: IEC 61513 (2001)
- Medical: IEC 62304 (2006)
- Automotive: ISO 26262 (2011)



Code Safety Standards

- Is it easy to get a hold of copies of these?



Aviation

- DO-178B / DO-178C
- Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification
 - Catastrophic: fatalities, loss of plane
 - Hazardous: negative safety, serious/fatal injuries
 - Major: reduce safety, inconvenience or minor injuries
 - Minor: slightly reduce safety, mild inconvenience
 - No Effect: no safety or workload impact



Automotive ISO 26262

- What is a document like this like?
- Vocab and definitions
- Management
- Safety Life Cycle
- Supporting processes
- Safety Analysis
- Risk Strategy
- Severity
 - S0 – No injuries



- S1 – No injuries
- S2 – Severe injuries
- S3 – Not survive-able
- Exposure
 - E0 – Unlikely to Happen
 - ...
 - E4 – High probability
- Controllability
 - C0 – Controllable
 - ...
 - C3 – Uncontrollable



- Look up those in a matrix so you know how to assess risk, know how important to fix, know what resources to apply



Medical Response

- IEC 62304 – medical device software – software lifecycle
 - Quality management system – establish the requirements needed for such a device, then design methods to be sure it meets these
 - Avoid reusing software of unknown pedigree (don't just cut and paste from stackoverflow)
 - Risk management – determining what all the risks involved are, then determine ways to avoid or minimize them



- Software safety classification

Class A: no injury possible

Class B: Nonserious injury possible

Class C: serious injury or death possible

Software sorted into these areas. Class A do not require the same precautions as the others.



Other notes

- Top down vs Bottom up Design
Spec out whole thing and how they work first
Start with core part and just keep adding to it until it works
- Requirements/Specifications?



Writing Good (Embedded) C Code

- Various books
- Comment your code!
- Strict, common code formatting (indentation)
- More exact variable types (`int32_t` not `int`) Size can vary on machine, and on operating system
- Subset to avoid undefined behavior



- Tool that enforces the coding standards
- Good to write safe code even if it isn't meant for a safe application. Why? Good practice. Also who knows who or when your code might be copied into another project.



MISRA

- **MISRA: Guidelines for the Use of the C Language in Critical Systems**
- Motor Industry Software Reliability Association
- Guidelines: Mandatory, Required, Advisory
- Some sample guidelines
 - Avoid compiler differences `int` (16 or 32 bit?) `int32_t`
 - Avoid using functions that can fail (`malloc()`) allocate memory at beginning of program not throughout
 - Maintainable code, comments, coding style (see



below)

- Compliance
 - All mandatory rules must be met
 - All required rules must have formal deviation
- Deviation
 - Must make a formal explanation for why deviation is necessary
 - Prove you've thought about the issue
- MISRA 2012 has 143 rules, 16 directives
- NOTE: YOU CAN STILL WRITE BAD CODE EVEN WHEN FOLLOWING THIS



It just makes it easier to write good maintainable code.



C Style

- What can C look like?
IOCCC (International Obfuscated C Code Competition)
- Variable style, CamelCase, under_score, Hungarian Notation (arru8NumberList)
- Indentation (tabs vs spaces)
- Curly braces on same or next line
- Comment style
- Auto-generated documentation from comments



Good Test Practices

- Unit testing
- Test Driven Development – tests written before the code happens, needs to pass the tests before done
- Fuzzing
- Device Hardening?



Good Documentation Practices

- Comment your code
- Write documentation! Make sure it matches code!
There are some tools that can auto-generate documentation from special code comments
- Use source control (git, subversion, mercurial)
- Use good commit messages in your source control



Space Shuttle Design

- https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/flyout/flyfeature_shuttlecomputers.html
- Issues normal embedded systems don't have: Vibration at liftoff, Radiation in Space
- If computer stopped for more than 120ms, shuttle could crash
- “Modern” update in 1991: 1MB Ram, 1.4MIPS. Earlier was 416k and 1/3 as fast and twice as big
- Change to code, 9 months testing in simulator, 6 months



more extensive testing

- 24 years w/o in-orbit SW problem needing patches
- 12 year stretch only 3 SW bugs found
- 400k lines of code
- HAL/S high-order assembly language (high-level language similar to PL/I)
- PASS software – runs tasks. Too big to fit in memory at once
- BFS – backup flight software. Bare minimum to takeoff, stay in orbit, safely land, fits in memory, monitors pASS during takeoff/landing Written by completely different



team.

- 28 months to develop new version
- IBM
- Extensive verification. One internal pass, one external
- 4 computers running PASS, one running BFS
- Single failure mission can continue; still land with two failures
- 4 computers in lock-step, vote, defective one kicked out



SpaceX Falcon 9

- Linux – on dual core x86 systems
- Three each, vote
- Flight software in C/C++
- Dragon displays in Chromium+JS

